面向延时敏感患者的转诊系统定价与能力规划

Pricing and capacity planning of the referral system with delay-sensitive patients

针对我国当前社区医院首诊而后向上转诊系统中医疗资源利用严重失衡的现状,研究了我国医疗转诊系统的服务能力设计与定价问题.通过建立一个排队和博弈的集成模型,分析了延时敏感病人选择行为下,三甲医院以利润最大化、社区医院以服务人数最大化的不同目标的竞争均衡.发现社区医院的最优服务能力随政府的补贴递增、三甲医院的诊疗费在政府补贴超过某个阀值时开始下降.结果表明政府的补贴政策是医疗转诊体系优化设计中有效的协调机制.

To relieve the serious utilization imbalance of medical resource in the community hospital referral system in China,this paper studies the service capacity design and its pricing via an integrated model of the queuing and game theory. The behavior of delay-sensitive patients is first captured,followed by a competition equilibrium between a profit-oriented class 3-A hospital and a community hospital,whose goal is to serve more patients. We show that the optimal service capacity of community hospital is increasing in the government＇s subsidy,while the price of class 3-A hospital is decreasing if the subsidy is sufficiently large. Our result also shows that the subsidy policy is an effective coordination mechanism to relieve the mentioned imbalance.