隐性存款保险下银行信息披露与风险承担

Relationship between bank information disclosure and bank risk-taking under implicit deposit insurance system

信息披露是市场约束的重要手段,但其能否发挥市场的约束作用,需要投资者对银行风险承担行为保持较高的敏感性.我国目前实行的是一种不完全隐性存款保险制度,在这一制度下,投资者对银行风险的关注程度会因为政府对银行支持程度的不同而有所差异.本文试图建立博弈模型用于分析这一特殊制度下的信息披露与银行风险承担行为间的相互作用机理,并实证研究了这一问题.研究表明,信息披露程度足够大时,发生危机而不一定得到国家全额资本金救助的银行倾向于选择稳健的风险承担策略;这一特殊制度下的银行倾向于承担较大的风险从而削弱信息披露对于银行风险承担的约束效应.因此,监管部门应努力提高银行强制信息披露的水平,以约束并降低银行更大风险承担行为发生的可能;同时,为了加强信息披露的市场约束作用,政府应逐步变革隐性存款保险制度为显性存款保险制度.

Information disclosure is an important means of market discipline. However,that disclosure can play the role of market discipline need investors pay attention to banks＇ risk taking behavior. In China,there exists a partially implicit insurance system. Unde this system,the attetion paid to banks＇ risk taking behaviors by investors varies with to the support that banks received from the government. We establish a game model to analyze the interaction mechanism between banks＇ risk-taking behaviors and disclosure under partially implicit insurance. We find that banks which are not surely rescued by government tend to choose the sound risk-taking strategy. Besides,under implicit deposit insurance system,banks tend to take excessive risk and the implicit deposit insurance may weaken the market constraint effect of disclosure. This paper uses empirical analysis to prove the relevant conclusions,and put forwards corresponding policy recommendations.