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中央企业上市公司并购绩效的实证研究 被引量:9

An Empirical Study on the Performance of M&A of Listed Central Government-owned Enterprises
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摘要 笔者基于我国2007—2011年中央企业上市公司的并购数据,采用主成分分析法和多元回归分析模型考察中央企业上市公司并购和经营绩效之间的关系;作为对比,也分析了同时期民企上市公司并购和经营绩效之间的关系。研究发现并购对于中央企业上市公司的综合绩效从并购当年一直到并购后四年内的影响为负,但同时期并购对于民营企业的绩效影响则略有不同。我们认为中央企业和民营企业在公司治理和代理成本上的差异可能是导致两类企业在并购完成后的绩效有显著不同的原因。稳健性检验的结果和文中多元回归分析的结果一致。研究结果表明,我国中央企业上市公司的并购战略并没有达到提升企业综合绩效的目的。 Based on the data regarding the M&A of listed Central Government-owned Enterprises between 2007-2011, this paper uses Principal Components Analysis and multiple regression analysis to examine the relation between the M&A and operation performance of listed Central Government-owned Enterprises; in contrast, the relation between M&A and the operation performance of listed private firms is examined as well. This study finds that the operation performance of listed Central Government-owned Enterprises has been consistently worse off for five years since the M&A. In contrast, the impact of M&A on the operation performance of listed private firms is different. We believe the reason which cause the differences is due to the differences in corporate governance and agency costs between these two kinds of firms. The results of robustness tests still support our multiple regression analysis results. The findings indicate that, in recent years, the M&A of listed Central Government-owned Enterprises have not achieved the goal of improving their holistic operation perform-ance through M&A.
作者 同生辉 王骏
出处 《中央财经大学学报》 CSSCI 北大核心 2015年第5期46-53,共8页 Journal of Central University of Finance & Economics
关键词 中央企业 上市公司并购 综合绩效 Central government-owned enterprises M&A of listed firms Holistic operation performance
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