基于系统动力学的跑道侵入风险演化博弈研究

A Research on Evolutionary Game of Runway Incursion Risks Based on System Dynamics

为探究跑道侵入风险控制中机场、航空公司与行业政府的博弈策略,构建了基于支付函数矩阵的三方演化博弈模型,并运用系统动力学对演化博弈过程进行仿真分析。设置了2种仿真环境:演化博弈模型中概率突变的情景以及动态监管策略下的博弈过程,通过了模型检验及灵敏度分析。仿真结果表明:该博弈模型存在有效解,但不存在演化稳定均衡解;改进的行业政府动态监管策略条件下存在演化稳定均衡解。得出结论:行业政府实行动态监管策略,令经济制裁额度为跑道侵入风险严重度的函数,促使机场和航空公司加大跑道侵入风险的控制力度。

In order to investigate game strategies between airports, airlines and industrial government for controlling runway incursion risks, a tripartite evolutionary game model is built based on payoff function matrix and the evolutionary game process simulated based on system dynamics. Two kinds of simulation en- vironments are set up, including probability mutation and dynamic regulation. The model has passed tests and sensitivity analysis. Simulation results show that the game model has effective solutions, but there is no evolutionary equilibrium. There is evolutionary equilibrium under the condition of dynamic regulation strategy. The conclusion is that economic sanction is imposed as the function of runway incursion risks se- verity. Industrial government implements dynamic regulation strategy which pushes airports and airlines to intensify the control of runway incursion risks.