公共文化设施建设业主方、承包方和公众三方进化博弈行为分析

An Evolutionary Game Behavior Analysis among the Owner,the Contractor and the Public in Public Cultural Facilities Construction

为了克服公共文化设施建设与管理中由参建方行为利益不同而引发的组织界面矛盾,推动我国公共文化惠民项目的顺利实施,运用进化博弈理论中的复制动力学分析法研究了公共文化设施业主方、承包方和公众三者之间的博弈关系。通过建立非对称三方博弈支付矩阵,解析复制动力学方程,得到了三方在不同条件下的稳定性策略,并利用三维立体相位图分别演示了不同参数变化对博弈三方策略选择演化趋势和稳定性的影响。结果发现,对投机行为的惩罚力度,监管成本和来自公众的社会正激励直接影响了业主方的策略选择;对投机行为的预期惩罚和公众评价的影响力度直接影响了承包方的策略选择;公共文化设施供给是否满足公众需求直接影响了公众的策略选择。将博弈三方不同条件下的策略演化趋势图相结合分析了整个博弈系统的均衡状态,得到了系统不同参数初始状态下的四组进化稳定策略。

In order to overcome the interfacial microstructure contradiction caused by participation and in- terests discrepancy in the public cultural facilities construction and management and improve public cultur- al projects, a replicated dynamic method in evolutionary game theory is used to research the game relation- ship among the owner, the contractor and the public in public cultural facilities construction of our coun- try. By building an asymmetric tripartite game payoff matrix and analyzing replication dynamic equation, stable strategies under different conditions are derived. And three dimensional stereograms are given to show the influence that the variation of different parameters have on the strategic evolutionary trend and sta- bility. Results show that punishment strength on speculation, supervision cost and positive social incentive from the public affect the owner＇s strategic choice; that anticipated punishment on speculation, and the public evaluation＇s influence on the income affect the contractor＇s strategic choice; and that whether the public cultural facilities supply meets the demand of the public affects the public＇s strategic choice. In the end, strategic evolutionary trend stereograms under different conditions of three parties are combined to discuss the whole system＇s game equilibrium states and find four groups of evolutionary stable strategies un- der different initial states of parameters.