寻路行为策略的进化博弈分析

Evolutionary Game Analysis of Wayfinding Behavior

针对我国交通枢纽站中乘客的寻路行为,建立了初访者群体之间以及初访者与熟悉者群体间的博弈模型及其复制动力学方程,并对复制动态做了分析和讨论,得出模型中博弈双方的进化稳定策略。研究结果表明枢纽站内初访者、初访者与熟悉者在有限理性基础上得到的进化稳定策略与标识布设的合理性有关,提出了改进标识布设以推进积极寻路行为发生的合理对策和建议。

For the wayfinding behavior of passengers in transit hubs,and a game model among unfamiliar passengers,a game model between familiar and unfamiliar passengers are presented. The duplicative dynamic equations of these models are formulated and analyzed to obtain evolutionary stable strategies. It is showed that the evolutionary stable strategies of unfamiliar passengers and familiar passengers based on bounded rationality depend on the rationality of singage layout. Finally,some reasonable advices about how to optimize singage layout to improve positive wayfinding behaviors are proposed.