养老服务集成商的服务质量决策分析

Analysis of Service Quality Decisions for Elderly Service Integrator

服务质量是影响养老服务产业发展的重要因素之一。作为实现养老服务产业化发展的良好载体,养老服务供应链模式应运而生,研究其核心企业——养老服务集成商的质量决策具有重要意义。为此,以养老服务集成商为研究对象,在给定服务提供商服务质量的情况下,研究不同市场需求规模下单个养老服务集成商以及多个服务集成商量在相互竞争学习时,养老服务集成商如何通过博弈获得最优质量决策的问题;在此基础上,分析质量风险影响下养老服务集成商在面对服务提供商时的服务质量决策。为养老服务集成商在实际运作中提供有效的管理决策支持,也为养老服务产业化发展提供重要的理论基础。

By the end of 2012, the aging population has been 194 million in China, giving rise to the serious ageing phenomenon. With family miniaturization and rapid development of society, the contradiction between the existing elderly modes and service needs has been increasingly severe. Meanwhile, the diversified development of elderly service needs has also promoted nearly more than 20 industries related with elderly services, bringing about a huge potential market. Therefore, elderly service quality has become an important guarantee for the sustainable development of elderly services industry. Currently, the model of Elderly Service Supply Chain（ESSC） is a good carder for the induslrialization development of elderly services. As its core enterprise, the elderly service integrator （ESI） plays a key role in managing and improving the whole industry＇s service level. Therefore, that, analysis of the ESI＇s service quality decisions, has an important significance. In this research, elderly service satisfaction sets as the measure of service quality. The game between the ESI and ESP was analyzed based on the service loss cost and service quality, and quality decision-making model for the ESI was built in the ease of given service quality from elderly service providers. Firstly, ESI＇s service quality decisions was analyzed in different market demand scale, from which we learned that in massive market demand scale, the ESI would select the low service quality while service loss cost was low; the ESI would endeavor to improve the service quality to a high level while the service loss cost was high enough; and an optimum service level existed to minimize the cost of ESI while the service loss cost was between a certain interval. In small market demand scale, the ESI had only two strategies： the ESI would select the low service quality while service loss cost was low, and would select the highest service quality while service loss cost was high. Furthermore, how to get optimal service quality decisions through the game between different ESIs was analyzed when they are competing with each other from which we gained that there was a positive correlation relationship between service quality and learning level for ESIs in massive market demand scale; and there was a negative correlation relationship between service quality and learning level for ESIs in small market demand scale. In addition, the game of service quality selection between ESIs was analyzed when they made decisions at the same time. Finally, ESI＇s service quality decisions affected by risks was proposed. In the study, we gained that under the influence of internal factors, the ESI＇s service quality （service satisfaction） was related to the ability level of quality risk implementation, ESP＇s service quality, the risk prevention cost coefficient and influence degree of ESP＇s service quality. Besides, when ESIs were in the face of the external market environment, there was also a possibillity to get the optimal service quality with the implementation of the best quality risk prevention. Therefore, this study provides an effective management decision support in actual operation for ESIs and an important theoretical basis for the development of ESSC.