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以财富价值最大化为目标的产权拍卖定价研究 被引量:1

A Study of Auction Pricing of Property by Maximizing the Value of Wealth
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摘要 利用财富价值最大化为目标函数建立了产权协商交易定价模型,并在导出的求解产权均衡价格的加权边际效用零和方程的基础上,依据在产权拍卖方的偏好与效用函数的结构给定的条件下多个竞标人的偏好与效用函数结构的差异和竞标人的预期价值与保留价格的差异等因素,运用产权拍卖方与多个竞标人的加权边际效用零和方程来决定产权招标投标和产权升价拍卖(或降价拍卖)的中标价格.以最高(或最低)均衡价格为中标价格的Pareto最优为基准,分析了竞标人最高可接受的中标价格和以拍卖方的交易底价为中标价格的财富价值损失和效率损失,解释了财富价值最大化的产权公允交易的经济学意义. English auction and Dutch auction of the property were obtained based on the zero-sum equation of weighted marginal utility to solve equilibrium price of the property deduced by a pricing model of negoti- ating transaction of the property right which can maximize wealth value, and by considering the differences between preference and utility function and the differences between the bidding reservation prices and the expected value to the object among different bidders where the preference and utility function of the auctioneer are given and the winning prices in competitive bidding. By comparing the winning price which is the highest equilibrium price in the sense of Pareto optimality, the loss of wealth and inefficiency in two situations were analyzed, one taking the highest value accepted by the bidder as the winning price, the oth- er taking the reservation price of the auctioneer as the winning price. Finally, an economic explanation for the fair transaction maximization of the value of the property right was given.
作者 杨忠直
出处 《上海交通大学学报》 EI CAS CSCD 北大核心 2015年第4期543-549,共7页 Journal of Shanghai Jiaotong University
基金 国家自然科学基金资助项目(70573070)
关键词 产权拍卖 财富效用函数 边际效用零和方程 PARETO最优 财富效应 property rights auction wealth utility function zero-sum equation of marginal utility Pareto optimality wealth effect
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