论纵向价格卡特尔的规制基础与结构优化

On Vertical Price Cartel: Regulatory Infrastructure and Structure Optimization

转销价格维持的反竞争效应及其规制原则长期存在争议。2013年茅台、五粮液因转销价格维持行为被重罚,虽适用纵向价格卡特尔的禁制条款,但在处罚对象上的单边性以及处罚理由中对市场地位的强调等方面又背离了价格卡特尔规制的传统模式。这些矛盾集中投射了纵向垄断规制的制度张力。通过《反垄断法》垄断行为谱系结构的再分析,可以揭示纵向价格限制的反竞争效应是以生产商形成"相当的价格支配力"作为基础的,尽管并不要求达到完全的支配地位。这样,纵向价格卡特尔的规制原则就可以超越现存的"本身违法"与"合理原则"之争,进而通过建构价格支配力的分析框架开辟新的优化进路。

Regarding resale price maintenance （RPM）, there exists long-lasting controversy on its anti- competitive effects and pertinent regulatory disciplines. Specifically in the RPM case of the heavy penalty of Moutai and Wuliangye in 2013, the authority, with explicit quotation of the prohibitory clause of cartel, resor- ted to the unilateral penalty and market-status orientation which deviated from the conventional mode of cartel- prevention. All the contradictions intensively reflect the institutional tensions on the rules and regulations of vertical monopoly. Through a pedigree analysis of monopoly actions in anti-trust law, it is unfolded that based on the RPM anti-competitive effects, the core manufacturer＇ s acquisition of is the considerable power of price dominance which is inferior to the absolute dominant power. Thus, being free from the existing complexity be- tween the intrinsic violation and rational doctrine, the regulatory disciplines of vertical price cartel have access to opening up a new approach through constructing the analysis frame for the power of price dominance.