财政分权、转移支付与地方政府环境治理

Fiscal Decentralization、Transfer Payment and Government Environmental Governance Efforts

选取地区工业污染源治理强度作为政府环境治理的代理指标,利用2003—2012年的省级面板数据实证检验了垂直治理体制下财政分权、转移支付与地方政府环境治理之间的关联。研究发现,财政分权自身并不是导致中国环境治理投入不足的原因,适度的财政支出分权能够有效地促进地方政府环境治理水平,财政收入分权和中央向下转移支付的对环境治理影响并不显著;在控制了财政分权和转移支付变量间的交互效应后发现,转移支付能在一定程度上强化地方政府环境治理,但过度分权降低了转移支付效率,造成环境治理投入偏低。

Using Industrial pollution intensity as Environmental governance efforts indicator, this paper tests the link among fiscal decentralization, transfer payments and local government environmental management efforts drawing on China＇s provincial panel dataset from 2003 to 2012. The main findings include ： Fiscal decentralization itself is not the cause of inadequate environmental governance. On the contrary, proper fiscal decentralization can effectively promote the local government environmental governance, but the effect of fiscal revenue decentralization and transfer payment is not significant. After controlling interactive items, the transfer payments can strengthen the environmental management effort, but excessive decen- tralization reduces the efficiency of transfer payment, causing environmental governance investment is low.