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Investing and Pricing with Supply Uncertainty in Electricity Market:A General View Combining Wholesale and Retail Market 被引量:2

Investing and Pricing with Supply Uncertainty in Electricity Market:A General View Combining Wholesale and Retail Market
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摘要 Renewable energy,such as wind and solar energy,may vary signifi cantly over time and locations depending on the weather and the climate conditions.This leads to the supply uncertainty in the electricity(power) market with renewable energy integrated to power grid.In this paper,electricity in the market is classified into two types:stablesupply electricity(SSE) and unstablesupply electricity(USE).We investigate the investment and pricing strategies under the electricity supply uncertainty in wholesale and retail electricity market.In particular,our model combines the wholesale and retail market and capture the dominant players,i.e.,consumers,power plant(power operator),and electricity supplier.To derive the market behaviors of these players,we formulate the market decision problems as a multistage Stackelberg game.By solving the game model,we obtain the optimal,with closedform,wholesale investment and retail pricing strategy for the operator.We also obtain the energy supplier's best price mechanism numerically under certain assumption.We fi nd the price of SSE being about 1.4 times higher than that of USE will benefi t energy supplieroptimally,under which power plant's optimal strategy of investing is to purchase USE about 4.5 times much more than SSE. Renewable energy,such as wind and solar energy,may vary signifi cantly over time and locations depending on the weather and the climate conditions.This leads to the supply uncertainty in the electricity(power) market with renewable energy integrated to power grid.In this paper,electricity in the market is classified into two types:stablesupply electricity(SSE) and unstablesupply electricity(USE).We investigate the investment and pricing strategies under the electricity supply uncertainty in wholesale and retail electricity market.In particular,our model combines the wholesale and retail market and capture the dominant players,i.e.,consumers,power plant(power operator),and electricity supplier.To derive the market behaviors of these players,we formulate the market decision problems as a multistage Stackelberg game.By solving the game model,we obtain the optimal,with closedform,wholesale investment and retail pricing strategy for the operator.We also obtain the energy supplier's best price mechanism numerically under certain assumption.We fi nd the price of SSE being about 1.4 times higher than that of USE will benefi t energy supplieroptimally,under which power plant's optimal strategy of investing is to purchase USE about 4.5 times much more than SSE.
出处 《China Communications》 SCIE CSCD 2015年第3期20-34,共15页 中国通信(英文版)
基金 supported in part by the National Natural Science Foundation of China(NSFC)No.61372116 and NSFC No.61201202 and NSFC No.61320001 the Importation and Development of High-Caliber Talents Project of Beijing Municipal Institutions under Grant YETP0110
关键词 最优投资策略 市场供应 零售市场 不确定性 定价策略 电力网 STACKELBERG博弈 可再生能源 electricity supply with uncertainty electricity investment electricity pricing wholesale market retail market Stackelberg game
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