风险投资特征、风险投资IPO退出与企业绩效——基于中国创业板上市公司的实证研究

Characteristics of Venture Capital,Venture Capital Exit through IPO and Firm Performance:An Empirical Research on Listed Companies of ChiNext Market

本文在对2009—2013年中国创业板公司风险投资退出特征刻画的基础上,深入研究了风险投资IPO退出的影响因素和经济后果。研究发现,企业上市后,我国风险投资呈现出一次性完全退出较少,非连续性完全退出较多的特征。风险投资特征对于其退出企业具有重要影响。风险投资所持有公司的股份越少,企业上市后其退出的概率越大;风险投资联合持股会导致企业上市后其更加易于退出。风险投资退出会对企业绩效产生负面影响,企业业绩会在风险投资退出后明显下滑;风险投资退出企业时减持原有股份越多,则企业绩效会变得越差。这从侧面佐证了风险投资对于提高企业绩效的积极作用。本文结论为深入认识我国风险投资的IPO退出及其对企业绩效的影响提供了理论基础和经验证据,并为国家完善金融监管,积极推动风险投资的发展,以及推进创业板市场的健康成长提供了决策依据和政策建议。

In Recent years,venture capital spring up in China.According to the China statistical yearbook on science and technology,the rate of new investments by venture capital firms grew even more rapidly,rising from10620 million Yuan in 2004 to 31850 million Yuan in 2012,which corresponds to real growth of more than 22%per year.Venture capital has gradually become an investment main body of Chinese capital market,and an important part of Chinese financial system.Despite the rapid development of Chinese venture capital,the venture capital industry has received much less Chinese academic scrutiny than other parts of the financial sector.The research about Chinese venture capital starts late and lags behind,especially the exit of venture capital.This is not conducive to the Chinese financial regulation and long-term development of the Chinese venture capital industry.Therefore,the aim of this paper to elaborate the exit of venture capital and its economic consequences based on the ChiNext market.The conclusions of this paper help us well understanding the determinants and consequences of venture capital exit from the companies after IPO,and put forward some valuable suggestions and decision-making basis for perfect the financial supervision and regulation to the nation,promote healthy development of ChiNext market and the development of venture capital industry.On the basis of the venture capital exit of the listed companies of ChiNext market from 2009 to 2013,this paper deeply examines the determinants of venture capital exit as well as the relationship between venture capital exit and firm performance.It is found that,after IPO,venture capitalists one-time exit from the companies is less,but discontinuity exit from the companies is more.On average,1.9658 years after IPO,venture capital exits the company.In addition,characteristics of venture capital have significant effects on its exit.The less stock shares hold by the venture capital,the greater the probability of venture capital exit from companies after IPO.Moreover,the syndication of venture capital will lead venture capital exit from companies after IPO more easily.Additionally,venture capital exit has a negative impact on the firm performance.The firm performance has declined significantly since venture capital exit.The more stock shares sell out when venture capital exit from the companies,the firm performance became worse.The empirical results from the paper show that venture capital provide value-added service to the companies,is conductive to the improvement of firm performance.Venture capital is a special and significant form of financial intermediation.Generally speaking,unlike commercial banking or insurance,venture capital firms provide privately held entrepreneurial firms with equity,debt,or hybrid forms of financing,often in conjunction with managerial expertise.In China,these entrepreneurial firms are playing an increasing important role recently.What is important is China needs more and more entrepreneurial firms.Therefore,in order to further deepen innovation economy and realize the national industrial upgrading and economic restructuring,China needs the support of venture capital.Two suggestions are put forward based on the study.First,the Chinese government should introduce some policies to strengthen the supervision and management of venture capital,and put an end to the quick success of their speculative behaviors.Meanwhile,the Chinese government should actively create a good ecological environment to develop some venture capital firms with good reputation so as to help the growth of entrepreneurial firms.Second,as a special shareholder,venture capital can make entrepreneurial firms performance improvement.Therefore,after IPO,the entrepreneurial firms lack of corresponding supervision and management due to venture capital exit.To some extent,this causes performance decline.So,on the one hand,the Chinese securities regulatory authorities should extend the shareholders stock lock up period so as to reduce the myopia behaviors of venture capital.On the other hand,entrepreneurial firms should perfect the corporate governance in order to replace the role of venture capital.