论康德对赫尔德活力论与目的论的批判

On Kant＇s Criticism of Herder＇s Theory of Vitalism and Teleology

十八世纪心灵哲学家们面临着尴尬的困境：他们要么把心灵还原为机器。要么把心灵推至科学研究无法触及的超自然主义领域。赫尔德的活力论主张，身心并非不同类的实体，而只是同一个基本活力的处于不同程度的组织形式与发展阶段。康德在《论哲学中目的论原则的使用》中认为赫尔德的活力概念与目的论思想超出了可能经验的界限，因而不具有科学的地位。康德在《判断力批判》中建构了一种更成熟、更精致的目的论思想，他不再简单地全盘否定自然目的论，而是把它看作对于人类理解自然而言有用的调节性的思维原则。

Throughout the eighteenth century philosophers of the mind were caught in the grip of a dilemma： either they explained the mind by reduc- ing it to a machine, or put the mind in a supernatural realm inaccessible to scientific study. Herder＇s theory of vitalism is a way to resolve this dilem- ma. According to Herder, mind and body are not distinct kinds of substance, but different degrees of organization and development of a single living power. Where Kant thinks that Herder＇s concept of organic power and teleology has no scientific status, and is only a kind of metaphysics, in his Ueber den Gebrauch der teleologischen Prinzipien in der Philosophic, he reconstructs a more mature and delicate theory of teleology, which does not been denied altogether, but be seen as a regulative principle of thinking in his Kritik de Urteilskrafi.