期刊文献+

从进攻到防御:里根时期美国核战略的演变及其影响论析

From Offensive to Defensive: Evolution and Influence of American Nuclear Strategy during the Reagan Administration
原文传递
导出
摘要 从20世纪60年代初到冷战结束,美苏两个超级大国一直处于"相互确保摧毁"的核均势中,这也是国际关系学界认为自古巴导弹危机后冷战整体上趋于缓和的原因。然而事实上,美国曾在此期间做出过重新确立自身核优势的一次努力,即从1980年到1983年制定并推行的一项极具进攻性的核战略——"抵消战略"。不过,该战略非但没有使美国达到威慑苏联的目的,反而使苏联陷入紧张,并导致美苏关系在80年代初急剧恶化。1983年底,北约在这一战略指导下进行的代号为"Able Archer 83"的核军事演习,更是险些使高度恐慌的苏联"先发制人",引爆美苏核战争。该事件成为冷战史上最具危险性的一个片段。此后,里根政府在短时间内迅速扭转了"抵消战略",回归到维持核均势的防御性轨道中,从而为80年代中后期美苏关系的缓和及冷战的和平终结奠定了基础。 The United States and the Soviet Union were under Mutual Assured Destruction from the 1960s to the end of the Cold War. Against such a backdrop, the Soviet Union, by exploiting its advantage of conventional forces, expanded extensively during the 1970s, posing much geopolitical pressure on America. Consequently, from the Carter Administration, the United States began to formulate and implement a more positive nuclear strategy named Countervailing Strategy, in order to intensify deterrence on USSR. After Reagan took office, this strategy was fully developed, including the invention of the Strategic Defense Initiative. However, it also made the US-Soviet relations in the beginning of 1980s much more strained and in November 1983, Able Archer 83 nuclear military exercise conducted by NATO, almost made the already hyper Soviets launch a first strike on the West. Interestingly, this incident also became a turning point in US-Soviet relations and US nuclear strategy. The Reagan Administration not only abruptly reversed the Countervailing Strategy, returning to the more defensive choice before Carter, but began to talk sincerely with the Soviets on strategic arms control.
作者 王浩 宋天阳
出处 《学术月刊》 CSSCI 北大核心 2015年第5期101-107,共7页 Academic Monthly
基金 2014年度国家留学基金资助项目(201406360094)的阶段性成果
关键词 美苏关系 相互确保摧毁 抵消战略 “Able Archer 83”事件 US-Soviet relations, mutual assured destruction, the countervailing strategy, Able Archer 83
  • 相关文献

参考文献39

  • 1Waltz, K., Nuclear Myths and Political Realities, American Political Science Review, 1990, 84(3).731-745.
  • 2Jervis, R., The Political Effects of Nuclear Weapons. A Comment, International Security, 1988, 13(2).80-90.
  • 3Jervis, R., The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution." Statecraft and the Prospect of Armageddon, Ithaca. Comell University Press, 1989.
  • 4Snyder, C., The Balance of Power and the Balance of Terror, in Seabury, P., ed., The Balance of Power, San Francisco. Chandler, 1965.
  • 5IGssinger, H., Diplomacy, New York. Simon & Schuster, 1994.
  • 6Halliday, F., The Making of the Second Cold War, London. Verso, 1983.
  • 7Jervis, R., Perception and Mispereeption in International Politics, Princeton. Prineeton University P~ss, 1976.
  • 8Hewitt, J., Jonathan, W., One-Sided Crises in the International System, Journal of the Peace Research, 1999, 36(3), pp.309-323.
  • 9Declassified Documents Reference System (DDRS).
  • 10Digital National Security Archive (DNSA).

相关作者

内容加载中请稍等...

相关机构

内容加载中请稍等...

相关主题

内容加载中请稍等...

浏览历史

内容加载中请稍等...
;
使用帮助 返回顶部