基金业绩费率背离与最优费率研究

The Study on Mutual Fund's Performance-Fee Deviation and the Optimal Fee Strategy

在梳理以往文献的基础上探讨了基金行业为何普遍存在业绩与费率的背离。该现象产生的主要原因是,在信息不对称条件下,基金投资者无法有效地识别基金业绩与费率的关系。进一步提出了一个基于信息不对称的分离均衡模型。该模型证明最优的基金费率设定策略是,能力强的基金应当降低营销费以吸引理性投资者,能力弱的基金应当加大营销开支以吸引非理性投资者。

Based on a review of the prior literature, it is shown that the widespread phenomenon of the deviation between mutual fund’ s performances and fees is due to investors’ failure to effectively recognize the relation be-tween fund performances and fees under information asymmetry.Furthermore, a theoretical model featuring a sepa-rating equilibrium is proposed.This model proves the optimal fee strategy to be that the better performing funds should reduce their marketing expenses to attract rational investors, whereas the worse performing funds should in-crease their marketing expenses to attract irrational investors.