产业技术创新联盟防“道德风险”激励机制设计

Motivation Mechanism Prevent Moral Hazard in Industrial Technology Innovation Strategic Alliance

产业技术创新联盟是中国近年来新出现的一种合作创新组织,其本质是一个合伙型自主工作团队,成员之间互为委托代理关系。运用合作博弈模型,从利益分配角度设计产业技术创新联盟防风险厌恶型成员"道德风险"的相互激励机制。可得出结论:提高联盟产出基数、降低联盟运行成本基数、提高成员产出分享比例,可激励其更加积极努力地投入联盟技术创新活动中。成员的努力程度提高,其个体效用和联盟总福利呈先增后减的趋势,其努力程度会保持在一个适当水平。而针对具有不同风险规避度的联盟成员,其个体效用和联盟总福利则会随着产出分享比例不同而呈现不同的变化趋势。对于风险规避度越高的成员,增加产出分享比例对其效用的边际贡献越小。

The Industrial Technology Innovation Strategic Alliance （ ITISA） is a new kind of cooperative innova-tion organization appeared in China in recent years.It’ s essentially a partnership autonomous project team for tech-nology innovation.The relationships among the members are mutual principal-agent.The motivation mechanism prevent multilateral moral hazard of risk reverse members in the ITISA are discussed by cooperative game model.It concludes：the member will participate in the technological innovation more actively with higher output share pro-portion, higher production base and lower operation cost base of the alliance.But the individual utility of the mem-ber and alliance general welfare will increase first and then decrease with the increase of the member’ s effort.They will present different trends with the sharing ratio of output since the members have different risk aversion degree. To the member with higher risk aversion degree, the marginal Contribution of the output share proportion of utility will be less.