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在线视频内容差异化定价分析——基于能力约束角度 被引量:2

Differential Pricing Equilibrium Analysis of Online Video Content Platform——Based on the Angle of Capacity Commitment
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摘要 文章对视频内容垂直差异化定价机制进行了创新,将同时考虑质量差异化与能力约束对内容产品定价的影响。文章拟建立一个双寡头竞争环境下的三阶段博弈模型,通过构建加入质量差异化与能力约束条件的视频内容子博弈模型,分析视频内容平台的定价与竞争策略。结论显示,在信息对称的条件下,考虑能力约束的竞争平台提供高低不同质量的视频内容均可达到子博弈均衡。选择低质量内容的平台依然可以获得单调递增的收益,并会模仿高质量平台提供的内容模式。也即是能力约束将使内容平台提供高质量内容的意愿消除,选择提供无差异化的低质量内容产品。 This study intends to bring forth new ideas on the vertical differentiation pricing mechanism of online video content, and meanwhile discusses the influence on video content pricing caused by vertical differentiation and capacity commitment. The study constructs a three-stage model under the duopoly competition environment. By building a sub-game model of online video content based on the quality differentiation and capacity commitment, the paper analyzes the price and competition strategy of online video content platform. The results indicate that competitive platform considering capacity commitment could achieve sub-game equilibrium by providing video content on different quality under the circumstance of equal information. Platform with low quality chose simulating the content pattern of high quality platform and also obtained monotonic increasing revenue. Due to the capacity commitment, content platform eliminates aspiration for increasing content quality content and provides non-differentiated low quality content.
出处 《技术经济与管理研究》 CSSCI 北大核心 2015年第5期7-11,共5页 Journal of Technical Economics & Management
关键词 视频内容 能力约束 纵向差异化 产品质量 互联网经济 Online video content Capacity commitment Vertical differentiation The quality of the product Internet economy
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