“一致政府”下的否决者:台湾地区立法机构审议两岸服务贸易协议探析

Veto Players in Unified Government:A Study of Legislative Deliberation of Cross-Strait Service Trade Agreement of Taiwan Province

本研究通过整合"否决者"与"否决点"的理论概念,分析台湾地区立法机构审议两岸服贸协议的具体过程。当台湾朝野政党的政策立场分歧强度提高时,在野阵营会通过党团协商与议事抗争策略,削弱国民党在立法机构程序委员会和委员会阶段的议程设定优势,使立法决策的多数决原则移向共识决原则,从而将立法过程的议程节点转变为立法否决点。因此,国民党当局虽然同时掌控台湾的立法系统和行政系统,但其立法运作却呈现类似"分立政府"下的低立法效能困境。

This paper studied the deliberation process in Cross-Strait Service Trade Agreement in the legislature of Taiwan province by employing the theoretic concepts of ＂veto players＂ and ＂veto points. ＂ When policy disputes between the ruling party and opposition party increase, the opposition party will reduce the advantage of Kuomintang in agenda-setting in the procedure committee as well as the general committee of the Legislative Yuan in Taiwan province through the strategies of party negotiation and procedural confrontation. By so doing, it replaces the majority rule with the consensus rule, and turns the agenda-setting points into the veto points. Although the Kuomintang controls both legislative and executive organs in Taiwan province, the so-called ＂unified government＂ has demonstrated it8 ineffectiveness, which is a phenomenon usually appearing in the ＂divided government. ＂