分利秩序与基层治理内卷化 资源输入背景下的乡村治理逻辑

The Hierarchy of Profit Division and Grassroots Governance Involution:The Logic of Rural Governance under the Background of the Resource Input

农村税费改革以后,国家资源的不断输入为农村发展和乡村治理带来新的契机。然而,资源输入乡村社会,基层组织却无法有效承接,并遭遇官民不合作的困境。基层组织主要呈现出两种样态:消极作为与难以作为,以及富人和灰黑势力主政后的摆平式"积极"治理。两种治理形态皆导致国家公共资源的耗损,基层组织的权威与合法性进一步下降。在资源不断输送的利益链条中,权力寻租者、地方富人与灰黑社会势力、谋利型的机会主义农民等几个行动主体相赖相生,形成分利秩序,普通民众被排除在外,乡村治理出现内卷化。从根本上说,这是国家在压力型体制与有效治理之间产生的张力,并在推动乡村社会从整体性支配向技术治理转型中产生的结果。这一转向试图建立新的公共规则,却使得乡村治权弱化,缺乏公共规则实践的强制力保证,造成国家、基层组织与农民三者之间的利益与责任的连带制衡关系发生断裂,乡村治理陷入新困境。

Since the launch of the reform of taxes and fees in 2002, the central government has issued a series of favorable policies for farmers and took a lot of resources to the countryside. Industry started to support agriculture. It brings new opportunity for rural development and rural governance, which gains support of the broad masses of farmers. In a way, it also helps consolidate the ruling foundation of Chinese Communist Party, and enhance the legitimacy of the state power. However, the political efficiency of the reform of the agricultural taxes and fees has quickly reduced, and the resource input to the countryside did not achieve the desired effect. On the one hand, grass-roots organizations cannot undertake topdown inputted resources effectively, and connect scattered farmers. On the other hand, the non-cooperation between officials and the farmers often ended up with predicament of governance of the ＂nail house＂ in the construction of the project. Under this background, grass-roots organizations mainly present two basic forms of governance. Some village cadres were afraid of ＂accident＂ and did things passively so much so that some even avoided the input of resources for the village construction. Other villages mainly were ruled by the rich and the grey black forces. They actively fight for resources and projects, and take a variety of means to solve the ＂nail households＂, and gain some benefits from the project or political capital for the development of their individual economy. Both governance forms have eroded the national resources and local public resources, and the authority and legitimacy of grassroots organizations further decline. On the resources input chain, a profit division hierarchy has been formed among people involved in power rent-seeking, local social forces of the rich and the grey black forces, opportunistic and interest- oriented farmers and so on. Ordinary people should have been the biggest beneficiaries of the input resources, but the hierarchal profit division impairs the interests of the broad masses of farmers. But they are reluctant to protest as the resources are mainly input from the above, not extracted from them. Grassroots governance is suffering from involution. Fundamentally, it is resulted from the tension between the oppressive system and effective governance, and it happens during the transformation of the rural societies from under integrity governance to under technology governance. However, the counterbalance relations of interests and responsibility among the state, grass-roots organizations and farmers produce fracture, and it is difficult for the input resources to produce maximum effectiveness and improve the condition of the rural governance. On the contrary, the input resources help nourish a profit-sharing group and the hiemrchal profit division of the grass-roots society has put rural governance into a new dilemma.