密封第一价格采购中销售商串谋的监管机制研究

Research on Regulation Mechanism of Bid Rigging in Sealed-Bid First-Price Procurement

标准拍卖中普遍存在的竞拍者串谋不仅给拍卖方和社会福利带来损失,而且由于缺乏数据常难以检测和控制。鉴于此,采用四阶段序贯博弈分析密封第一价格采购中竞拍者串谋的监管问题,基于销售商的竞拍出价建立检测采购中竞拍者串谋的理论模型,相比其他检测模型多依赖于包括竞价、产能、库存、参与决策在内的大量竞拍者的历史和当期数据的"事后"检测特点,该模型具有仅依赖于竞价和估价的当期数据的"事中"检测特点。研究得到存在串谋和不存在串谋两种情况下,销售商不同的出价分布和出价区间,以及监管方对销售商串谋的概率判断和审核决策,解决了难以获取研究所需充足数据的困境,提高了串谋检测的可操作性。

The bidder collusion universally existed in standard auction usually brings loss of auctioneer and social welfare at large, and is often difficult to detect and control due to the lack of data. In view of this, this paper analyzes the regulation system in sealed - bid first - price procurement by four - stage Sequential game. In order to achieve this, a theoretical model based on the bidding price of sellers during auction has been established. Contrasted to previous models which could only post - detect auction re- lying on historical and current data such as bidding price, production capacity, inventory and anticipation decision of the partici- pants, this model can simultaneously detect the distribution and interval of sellers＇ price as well as supervisor＇ s probability recog- nizing and examine decision to them based on current data only in both cases of conspiracy and non - conspiracy during the bidding, thus solve the problem of lacking data and improve the operability of conspiracy - detecting.