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直觉还是日常认知能力——威廉姆森的思想实验辩护策略 被引量:1

Intuition or Ordinary Cognitive Capacity:Williamson's Justification Strategy
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摘要 面对来自实验主义者的直觉挑战,提摩西·威廉姆森通过日常认知能力捍卫了思想实验激发的命题作为哲学理论证据的主张。根据威廉姆森的观点,实验主义的直觉挑战是一种应该被拒斥的判断怀疑主义。传统主义诉诸直觉的辩护策略是引发怀疑主义的理论根源。乔纳森·温伯格反对威廉姆森把实验主义归为怀疑主义的主张;杰西卡·布朗为传统主义提供了辩护。但是从哲学方法论的角度来看,威廉姆森的辩护策略是不充分的并且不能完全回应实验主义的挑战。 Facing the intuition challenge from experimentalists , by means of ordinary cognitive capacity , Timothy Williamson defends that a proposition prompted by thought experiment is evidence for philosophy theory .In accordance with Williamson’s view ,the intuition challenge from experimentalists is a kind of judgment skepticism which should be refuted by philosophers .This kind of judgment skepticism is brought about by the justification strategy of traditionalism w hich appeals to intuitions to justify the proposition prompted by thought experiment as evidence for philosophy theory . Jonathan M . Weinberg argues against Williamson’ s view w hich attributes experimentalists to skepticism ;Jessica Brow n defends the justification strategy of traditionalism . However ,appeal to ordinary cognitive capacity is not sufficient to justify the proposition prompted by thought experiment as evidence .Additionally ,Williamson does not completely reply the intuition challenge from experimentalists .
作者 卢析
出处 《山东大学学报(哲学社会科学版)》 CSSCI 北大核心 2015年第3期140-149,共10页 Journal of Shandong University(Philosophy and Social Sciences)
关键词 直觉 思想实验 提摩西·威廉姆森 判断怀疑主义 intuitions thought experiment Timothy Williamson judgment skepticism
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  • 1Timothy Williamson, The Philosophy of Philosophy, Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2007, p. 220.
  • 2Herman Cappelen, Philosophy without Intuitions, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012, p. 84.
  • 3Timothy Williamson, "Philosophical 'Intuitions' and Scepticism about Judgement", Dialectica, Vol. 58 (1) 2004, p. 152.
  • 4Jonathan M. Weinberg, "On Doing Better, Experimental-Style", Philosophical Studies, Vol. 143(3), 2009, p. 455.
  • 5Timothy Williamson, "Philosophical 'Intuitions' and Scepticism about Judgement", Dialectica, Vol. 58(1), 2004, p. 111.
  • 6Joshua Alexander, "Is Experimental Philosophy Philosophical Significant," in Joachim Horvath and Thomas Grundman (eds.), Experimental Philosophy and its Critics, 2012, New York: Routledge Publishing, p. 97.
  • 7Timothy Williamson, The Philosophy of Philosophy, Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2007, p. 184.
  • 8Timothy Williamson, The Philosophy of Philosophy, Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2007, p. 186.
  • 9Stephen Schiffer, "Evidence = Knowledge.. Williamson' s Solution to Skepticism", in Patrick Greenough and Duncan Prtchard (eds.), Williamson on Knowledge, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009, p. 183.
  • 10Timothy Williamson, The Philosophy of Philosophy, Oxford Blackwell Publishing, 2007, p. 210.

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