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我国建立显性存款保险制度的思考——基于隐性与显性制度下银行道德风险的比较 被引量:1

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摘要 通过定性对比分析隐性和显性存款保险制度,找出各自的利弊,其对策是:保持存款保险机构独立性,完善银行信息披露制度,杜绝监管宽容。并建立数学模型,定量比较商业银行在隐性和显性存款保险制度下道德风险的差异。
作者 肖畅
机构地区 华东政法大学
出处 《北方经贸》 2015年第5期203-204,共2页 Northern Economy and Trade
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