分析师预测与上市公司审计收费研究——基于信息不对称理论的视角

Analyst Projection and Audit Fees of Listed Companies:From the Perspective of Information Asymmetry Theory

分析师是资本市场重要的信息中介,能有效缓解资本市场中的信息不对称。注册会计师在估算审计收费时,是否使用了分析师所提供的信息呢?基于信息不对称理论的视角,研究分析师预测与审计收费之间的关系。以分析师预测准确度和离散度来衡量信息不对称,验证了注册会计师在评估被审计公司的审计风险时,是如何参考分析师预测来估算审计收费的。研究结果表明,分析师预测准确度与审计收费呈显著负相关关系;预测离散度与审计收费呈显著正相关关系。进一步研究发现,由于小型公司、上市时间较短的公司有着较高的信息不对称程度,分析师预测与审计收费之间的关系在这两类公司中较强。

Analysts are important information intermediary in capital market as they can effectively alleviate the information asymmetry. Do CPAs use the information provided by analysts when estimating the audit fees？ This paper tries to review the relationship between analysts＇ forecasts and audit fees according to the information asymmetry theory. By using the analyst earnings forecast accuracy and dispersion to measure the information asymmetry thereof, this paper tries to verify whether and how auditors refer to analyst earning forecast to estimate audit fees when they assess client audit risks. The results of this study show that analyst forecast accuracy （dispersion） is negatively （positively） correlated with audit fees. Further study found that small corporations and corporations listed in a relatively short time have a higher information asymmetry, the relationship between analysts＇ forecasts and audit fees has become more significantly correlated among these similar corporations.