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GNSS接收机欺骗干扰功率控制策略 被引量:14

Spoofing power control strategy for GNSS receiver
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摘要 为保持对目标接收机的持续有效欺骗,增强欺骗干扰的隐蔽性,从信号传播损耗、噪声基底、仰角因素等方面对欺骗干扰的功率控制问题进行了定量的分析,得出了一种欺骗功率控制策略。该方法通过实时调整欺骗干扰的总功率及各支路信号功率,使得噪声基底的抬高幅度和最大欺骗信号信噪比限制在一定范围内。仿真表明,通过实时调整欺骗功率,可以将噪声基底限制在3 d B内,将最大欺骗信号信噪比限制在22 d B内,实现持续有效欺骗。该方法可行性较强,对欺骗干扰机的研制具有重要的指导意义。 In order to maintain spoofing on the target receiver in real-time, a power control strategy was achieved based on quantitative analyses on signal propagation loss, noise level, and elevation factor. With this strategy and by real-time adjusting the total spoofing power and the power of each branch signal, the noise floor and the maximum spoofing SNR can be restricted to a limited range. Simulations verify the effectiveness and sustainability of maintaining deception, with the noise floor and the maximum spoofing SNR being limited to within 3 dB and 22 dB, respectively. This strategy is feasible and helpful for the development of GNSS spooler.
出处 《中国惯性技术学报》 EI CSCD 北大核心 2015年第2期207-210,218,共5页 Journal of Chinese Inertial Technology
基金 国家自然科学基金面上项目(41274013 41471387)
关键词 卫星导航接收机 欺骗干扰 功率控制 传播损耗 噪声水平 GNSS receiver spoofing interference power control propagation loss noise level
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参考文献9

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共引文献51

同被引文献72

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