标准规制、产品责任制与声誉——产品质量安全治理研究综述

Standard Regulation,Product Responsibility System and Reputation:A Review of Product Quality and Safety Governance

产品质量安全信息在买方与卖方之间的分布不对称,是导致产品市场发生"逆向选择"或"道德风险"的根本原因。引入标准规制能在一定程度上解决信息不对称问题,但不同市场结构下标准规制的干预强度及对不同厂商的激励效果存在争议。同时,产品责任制可以内部化预期事故成本激励生产具有潜在危害产品的厂商在事前采取预防措施。但两种规制也越来越多地面临高规制成本的质疑,低交易成本的声誉治理便可作为补充。本文综述产品质量安全领域的标准规制、产品责任制及声誉治理机制研究,重点梳理微观经济学模型的演化逻辑,为后续的基础理论研究提供比较全面的概览。

Information asymmetry about product quality and safety between buyer and seller is the main reason that leading market to ' adverse selection' or ' moral hazard'. In a certain extent,standard regulation can reduce information asymmetry,while the intensity of intervention and the motivation for different product manufacturers under different market structure are controversial. Meanwhile,product responsibility system can motivate product manufacturer incentive to take preventive actions before production process through internalization expected accident cost. But these two regulations are increasingly facing the query of high regulation cost,while reputation governance with lower transaction cost can be used as a supplement. This paper reviews the standard regulation,product responsibility system and reputation governance mechanism in the field of product quality,and analyzes the evolution logic of the microeconomic model,these provide a comprehensive overview for future researches.