有效市场下的政府监管、司法干预与公司自治:关系架构与制度选择

Administrative Regulation, Judicial Interference and Company Autonomy under the Efficient Market: The Relationship Structure and Institutional Choice

政府监管作为作用于市场经济的一种强制手段,具有侵扰市场秩序与侵害私人自由、利益之天然倾向,对其遏止的最好方法是法治,也即政府监管必须符合法治的要求。在由普通法、法庭所构成的私法体系及其诉讼实现机制与政府监管之间,究竟哪一个在维护市场秩序上更有效,争论将一直持续,相关的关系架构及制度选择要处理好四个关系:国家强制适用范围的有限性;国家强制强度的合目的性;国家强制手段的多重选择性;不同强制手段之间的制衡性。任何国家强制措施都是状态依存的,随相关的制度环境变化而变革,不存在一个统一的最佳模式。我国需要借鉴域外法的制度模式,但更要依循自身的经验路径,在不断的试错、容错与纠错中形成自己的适应性制度模式。

As a coercive method imposing on market, administrative regulation has a natural tendency to disturb market order and infringe individuals' freedom and interests. The best way to refrain administrative regulation from abuse is exercising state power in line with the rule of law principle. There are two approaches to maintain market order, i.e. the private law system and its litigation mechanism based on common law and courts, and administrative regulation. No conclusion has been reached on which is the more effective one. In fact, none of them should be overlooked. In the process of structuring their relations and making institutional choices, four issues should be handled appropriately: the limitation of the application scope of state coercion, the purposiveness in the enforcement strength of state coercions, the alternativeness of state coercion methods, and the check and balance among different coercive methods. There is no best pattern universally adopted. Any state coercion is existent, evolving with the change of relevant institutional environment. China should draw foreign experience, as well as follow its own practical route, which is more important. With the continuing trial and error, error tolerance and error correction process, a self adaptive institutional pattern will be established.