基于契约的质量监管理论研究

Theoretical Study on Quality Supervision Based on Contract

本文将契约理论引入质量监管政策分析,奠定了质量契约的经济学基础。分析了质量契约的主体、不均衡性和博弈关系,提出了质量契约中普遍存在的道德风险、技术风险(可预知和不可预知)、市场风险和制度风险,以及质量监管措施的风险防范作用。本文的理论分析有助于深刻理解市场主体(生产者、消费者等)、担保主体(认证机构等)和监管者(政府)的关系,对我国当前的市场监管体制改革具有一定的借鉴意义。

The article applies contract theory to the policy analysis of quality supervision, and establishes the economic foundation for quality contract. Also, the article analyses the imbalance and game relations of the main bodies of quality contract, raises the morality, technology, market and institutional risks universally existing in quality contract as well as the risk prevention role of quality supervision measures. The theoretical analysis helps to understand deeply the relationship among the market entities, the guarantee bodies and the supervisors, providing reference to the reform of domestic market supervision system.