高管年龄与薪酬激励:理论路径与经验证据

Top Manager Age and Compensation:Theoretical Approach and Empirical Evidence

本文利用中国沪深A股上市公司2004—2012年数据,研究高管年龄对薪酬契约的影响。研究结果发现,高管年龄对薪酬水平具有显著的影响,相对年龄与绝对年龄越大的高管获得了更高水平的薪酬,但研究同时发现与薪酬存在显著关系的年龄与企业业绩之间并没有显著的相关性,并且高管年龄降低了薪酬业绩的敏感性,尤其是业绩下降时的薪酬业绩敏感性,反映高管的年龄降低了薪酬契约的有效性。进一步研究表明,高管年龄对薪酬契约的影响存在社会资本的中介作用,年龄越大的企业高管更可能具有政治资本,而这种社会资本增强了其在薪酬契约签订中的谈判力和控制力。本文的结论反映基于高管异质性特征的研究为人力资源理论、管理者权力理论以及社会资本理论在管理者薪酬契约中的应用提供了分析的视角。

Employing the data of Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies from 2004 to 2012 in China,this paper studies the effect of top manager age on the compensation contract.The results of the study indicate that top manager age has a significant impact on the compensation.Top managers of high absolute age and relative age gain more compensation.But this study also finds that top manager age,which has significant correlation with the compensation,has no significant correlation with corporate performance.And the age of top managers reduce the pay-performance sensitivity,especially when there is a decline in performance level.Which indicate that owing to the managers’ behavior of ＂taking advantage of the seniority＂,the effectiveness of compensation contract is reduced.Further studies show that this phenomenon indicates the mesomeric effect of the social capital.The older top managers are more likely to have political capital.This kind of social capital enhances top managers’ power to negotiate and control when sign their compensation contract.The results of this paper based on the managerial heterogeneities provide analyses angle for the application of human resources theory,managerial power theory and social capital theory in the management compensation contract.