期刊文献+

风险投资联盟结构、声誉与创业项目成功率——基于中国创业企业的实证研究 被引量:4

Syndication Structure of Venture Capital,Reputation and the Success Probability of Entrepreneurial Projects——Evidence from Chinese Entrepreneurial Enterprises
下载PDF
导出
摘要 创业项目成功率(绩效)对于创业企业和风险投资机构都至关重要。从联盟层面着手,对风险投资联盟结构这一概念进行了界定,探讨了风险投资联盟结构、风险投资机构声誉对创业项目成功率的影响作用。通过联盟绩效理论、资源观理论、团队生产理论分析提出相关假设,利用国内CVsource的风险投资数据库,对2000年-2012年间的VC融资事件进行了数据分析,运用Probit概率回归分析验证了三个研究假设。实证结果表明:风险投资联盟结构对项目成功率的影响存在显著差异,即与早期融资轮次是联合风险投资但后期融资轮次是单独投资的创业项目相比,各个融资轮次都是联合风险投资的创业项目具有更高的项目成功率;风险投资机构的声誉越高,创业项目的成功率越高;而且,还发现风险投资机构声誉在风险投资联盟结构与项目成功率间的关系中发挥了正向调节作用。 The success probability (or performance) is critical for entrepreneurial enterprises and venture capital organizations. Starting from the alliance level, this study defines the concept of syndication structure of venture capital, and examines the impact of syndication structure and rep- utation on the success probability of entrepreneurial projects. Research hypotheses are proposed by analyzing alliance performance theory, resource- based view, and team production theory. By u- sing the venture capital database of domestic CVsource, the paper makes statistical analysis on VC financing issue from 2000 to 2012. Three research hypotheses are proved through Probit probabili- ty regression analysis. Results show that the structure of syndication in venture capital has a signif- icantly positive impact on the success probability of projects, that is, firms obtaining financing from a VC syndicate throughout various financing rounds are more likely to have a higher project success probability compared to those which have syndicate financing in earlier rounds but switch to financing from a single VC in later rounds. Besides, the organizational reputation of venture capital has a significantly positive impact on the success probability of projects. Furthermore, rep- utation of venture capital organizations plays a moderating role in adjusting the relationship be- tween the syndication structure of venture capital and the success probability of projects positively.
作者 陈敏灵
出处 《云南财经大学学报》 CSSCI 北大核心 2015年第3期128-139,共12页 Journal of Yunnan University of Finance and Economics
基金 陕西省软科学研究计划项目"陕西风险投资机构的联合投资结构与项目成功退出研究"(2013KRM14) 陕西省社会科学基金项目"风险投资机构的社会资本 风险投资联盟结构与创业企业成功率研究"(2014P13) 陕西省教育厅专项科研计划项目"科技型创业企业的控制权配置方式及配置机理研究--基于演化博弈的视角"(2014JK1556) 西安石油大学博士科研启动基金项目(2014BS32)
关键词 风险投资联盟结构 风险投资机构声誉 创业项目成功率 Syndication Structure of Venture Capital Organization Reputation of Venture Capital Success Probability of Enterprise
  • 相关文献

参考文献20

  • 1Lerner J. The Syndication of Venture Capital In- vestments [ J ]. Financial Management, 1994, 23(3) : 16 -27.
  • 2Tian X. The Role of Venture Capital Syndication in Value Creation for Entrepreneurial Firms [ J ]. Review of Finance, 2012, 16 ( 1 ) : 245 - 283.
  • 3Guo D, Jiang K. Venture Capital Investment and the Performance of Entrepreneurial Firms: Evi- dence from China [ J ]. Journal of Corporate Fi- nance, 2013, 22(9): 375-395.
  • 4Humphery- Jenner M, Jo- Ann S. Foreign VCs and Venture Success: Evidence from China[ J]. Journal of Corporate Finance, 2013, 21 (7) : 16 -35.
  • 5Das T K. Deceitful Behaviors of Alliance Part- ners : Potential and Prevention [ J]. Management Decision, 2005, 43 (5) : 706 - 19.
  • 6薛卫,雷家骕,易难.关系资本、组织学习与研发联盟绩效关系的实证研究[J].中国工业经济,2010(4):89-99. 被引量:60
  • 7Gompers P A, Kovner A, Lerner J. Specializa- tion and Success: Evidence from Venture Capital [ J ]. Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 2009, 18(3): 817-844.
  • 8Dimov D, De Clercq D. Venture Capital Invest- ment Strategy and Portfolio Failure Rate: a Lon- gitudinal Study [ J ]. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 2006, 30 (2) : 207 - 223.
  • 9Nahata R. Venture Capital Reputation and In- vestment Performance [ J ]. Journal of Financial Economics, 2008, 90(2) : 127 - 151.
  • 10Gompers P A. Grandstanding in the Venture Capital Industry [ J ]. Journal of Financial Eco-nomics, 1996, 42( 1 ) : 133 - 156.

二级参考文献76

  • 1迟克莲.战略管理中的资源论[J].中国管理科学,2000,8(S1):177-182. 被引量:35
  • 2彭华涛,谢冰.联合风险投资的网络特性与价值溢出机理分析[J].管理工程学报,2005,19(4):45-48. 被引量:12
  • 3王松奇.《中国创业投资发展报告2004》,经济管理出版社2004年版.
  • 4Alex Coad, The Exponential Age Distribution and the Pareto Firm Size Distribution. Jena Economic Research Papers, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena, Max-Planck-Institute of Economics. Vol. 10,2008, pp. 389-395.
  • 5Alfredo Del Monte and Erasmo Papagni. ,R&D and the Growth of Firms: Empirical Analysis of a Panel of Italian Firms. Research Policy, Vol. 32, No. 6,2003, pp. 1003 - 1014.
  • 6Brown, James R. After the IPO: A Study of the Long-Run Relative Performance of Venture-Backed Firms. Working Paper, Washington University in St. Louis, No. 25,2003.
  • 7Engel D. , Max K. Firm-level Implications of Early Stage Venture Capital Investment-Ar; Empirical Investigation. Journal of Empirical Finance. Vol. 2,No. 14,2007,pp. 150-167.
  • 8Espenlaub,S. ,I. Garrett and W.P. Mun. Conflicts of Interest and the Performance of Venture Capital-Backed IPOs: A Preliminary Look at the UK. Venture Capital, Vol. 1, No. 4,1999, pp. a25-350.
  • 9Gompers, Paul A. Grandstanding in the Venture Capital Industry. Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 42, No. 1,1996, pp. 133-156.
  • 10Gompers, Paul and Josh Lerner. Conflict of Interest in the Issuance of Public Securities: Evidence from Venture Capital. Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 42, No. 1,1999, pp. 1-28.

共引文献86

同被引文献47

  • 1蔡继荣.动态议价过程的战略联盟不稳定性分析[J].理论探索,2006(6):89-91. 被引量:5
  • 2潘开灵,白列湖,程奇.管理协同倍增效应的系统思考[J].系统科学学报,2007,15(1):70-73. 被引量:36
  • 3SAPIENZA H J, AMASON A C, MANIGART S. The level and nature of venture capitalist involvement in their portfolio companies: a study of three European countries[J]. Managerial Finance, 1994, 20(1): 3-17.
  • 4FREEMAN C. Networks of innovators: a synthesis of re- search issues[-J. Research Policy, 1991, 20(5): 499-514.
  • 5LUO J. Network structure and ev01vability of innovation e- cosystems[-C-]. Academy of Management,2014(1) :11518.
  • 6HALEVY T. Winning with Alliances[-EB/OL]. http:// www. allianeeanalyst, com/ArticlelOctl5 - 00. html.
  • 7REUER J J, ARINO A, OLK P M. Entrepreneurial alli- ances[M]. Prentice Hall, 2011.
  • 8SPENCE M. Job market signalingJ-]. The Quarterly Jour- nal of Economics, 1973,87(3) : 355-374.
  • 9RINDOVA V P, WILLIAMSON I O, PETKOVA A P, et al. Being good or being known: an empirical examination of the dimensions, antecedents, and consequences of or- ganizational reputation[J]. Academy of Management Jour- nal, 2005, 48(6): 1033-1049.
  • 10HAUNSCHILD P R. How much is that company worth: interorganizational relationships, uncertainty, and acquisi- tion premiums [ J ]. Administrative Science Quarterly, 1994,39: 391-411.

引证文献4

二级引证文献23

相关作者

内容加载中请稍等...

相关机构

内容加载中请稍等...

相关主题

内容加载中请稍等...

浏览历史

内容加载中请稍等...
;
使用帮助 返回顶部