在职消费与公司绩效:代理观还是效率观——基于高管激励视角的研究

Perquisites and Corporate Performance:Agent View or Efficiency View, Research Based on the Perspective of Executive Incentive

关于在职消费对公司绩效的影响,有两种不同的观点:代理观和效率观。从高管激励的视角分析高管薪酬与在职消费以及在职消费与公司绩效之间关系的影响,可以发现,高管货币薪酬激励程度不同,在职消费对公司绩效的影响也不同。当货币薪酬激励不足时,在职消费对公司绩效有正向影响,效率观发挥作用;当货币薪酬激励过度时,所有者约束不足,管理层权力过大,在职消费和超额薪酬都沦为高管侵害股东利益的工具,此时在职消费对公司绩效有负向影响,代理观发挥作用。高管激励实践中必须考虑两种激励方式的相互作用,而不是盲目限制或一味推崇在职消费。

There are two views on how perquisites influence the corporate performance, namely, the agent view and the efficiency view. Studies on the relationship among executive salary, perquisites, and corporate performance show that different levels of executive salary lead to different relationships between perquisites and corporate performance. In general, the efficiency view is more effective when executive monetary incentive is inadequate, that is, perquisites lead to higher corporate performance; and the agent view is more effective when executive monetary incentive is excessive, that is, perquisites bring negative impacts on the corporate performance. This article suggests that a balanced executive incentive policy should be considered if the optimal corporate performance is to be achieved.