随机需求时上游段VMI模式利益分配模型研究

Profit Distribution of Upstream Segment for VMI Supply Chain under Stochastic Demands

当需求随机时,通过比较包含一个制造商与多个供应商的上游段实施VMI前后的收益,首先建立Stackelberg博弈的价格补贴模型,但是该模型中,制造商自身的最大收益与供应链整体最大收益存在矛盾,于是提出基于Nash谈判的收益共享契约,可使供应链整体收益最大,但是当某些成员的谈判实力较弱时,收益却不如价格补贴下的收益。于是以价格补贴下的收益为起点,对供应链的最优收益进行Nash谈判。结果表明:与单独使用价格补贴或者基于Nash谈判的收益共享契约相比,以价格补贴模型下各方收益为起点进行的Nash谈判不仅使供应链整体期望收益最大,供应链各成员的收益也获得了提高。

With stochastic demands considered, comparing the expected profit of upstream segment under VMI model to the traditional model, we build a model of markdown money mechanism based on Stackelberg game. But this model produces some contradiction between manufacturer＇s most profit and the optimal profit of the supply chain. So we propose revenue sharing contract based on Nash negotiation. With this model, the supply chain achieves the optimal expected profit, but some members of the supply chain achieve less profit than that under the model of markdown money mechanism. So we propose revenue sharing contract based on Nash negotiation which the starting point is the expected profit under the model of markdown money mechanism based on Staekelberg game. Finally,the research shows：in contrast with the model of markdown money mechanism and the revenue sharing contract based on Nash negotiation, under the model of the revenue sharing contract based on Nash negotiation which the starting point is the expected profit under the model of markdown money mechanism based on Stackelberg game, the supply chain, the manufacturer and every supplier achieve more expected profit.