对塔斯基的逻辑后承概念定义的辩护

Defense for A. Tarski's Concept of Logic Consequence

塔斯基在1936年给出了逻辑后承概念的模型论定义。埃彻门第批评说,塔斯基的定义面临两个严重的问题,即外延的非恰当性和概念分析的非恰当性。事实上,塔斯基的定义在经适当修正之后可以避免"过度"和"不及"问题,其外延因而是恰当的。塔斯基的定义之基础概念是满足而非真,塔斯基的定义在概念的还原性分析上并不存在问题。如果按照对通常的后承概念的直觉,逻辑后承的核心特征就是保真性,那么塔斯基的定义就是对逻辑后承的恰当刻画。

Alfred Tarski proposed the modern model-theoretic definition of logical consequence in 1936,but John Etchmendy argued that Tarski's definition has two serious problems: extensional inadequacy and conceptual inadequacy of the analysis. Factually,Tarski's definition,with some moderate modifications,can avoid the problems of over-generalization and under-generalization,hence hisdefinition is extensionally adequate. Based on the basic idea that his definition is not truth but satisfaction,the paper proposes that there is no problem in the reductive analysis in Tarski's definition. The author concludes that if the central characteristic of logical consequence,according to the intuition of logical consequence,is not beyond truth-preservation,Tarski's definition is an adequacy characterization of logical consequence.