摘要
基于新经济地理学的视角,通过构建模型解析了财政分权情境下中国地方政府制定碳减排标准的微观机理。结合1995—2012年28个省市的面板数据,利用随机前沿分析法进一步测算了全要素碳减排效率,并以其为因变量验证了财政分权对碳减排的内在联系。研究发现财政分权与CO2减排效率之间呈倒U型关系,即适当的财政分权有利于提高CO2减排效率,而过度分权则会适得其反,而就当下大部分地区财政分权状况而言,中央政府可以选择适当提高分权水平以提升CO2减排效率。同时,立足于不同的财政分权水平,地方政府保护主义引发的市场分割将会进一步改变财政分权对碳减排效率的影响。
Based on the perspective of new economic geography, we analyzed the micro mechanism of the establishment of carbon emissions standards by the local government under the influence of factors such as initial endowment and local population, and puts forward the hypothesis that fiscal decentralization has a nonlinear effect on carbon emission reduction efficiency, etc. Then, by using the panel data of 28 provinces and cities in 1995-2019, we calculated carbon emission reduction efficiency in view of total factor through the method of stochastic frontier analysis （SFA）. Finally, we proved the inverted u-shaped relationship between fiscal decentralization and carbon emission reduction efficiency. Meanwhile, we found the degree of market integration can weaken the negative effects of fiscal decentralization on carbon emission reduction efficiency.
出处
《经济地理》
CSSCI
北大核心
2015年第5期160-165,共6页
Economic Geography
基金
国家自然科学基金项目(71173170
71272143)
教育部人文社会科学面上项目(13YJA630071)
浙江工商大学青年人才基金项目(QY11-12)
关键词
二氧化碳
财政分权
减排效率
市场分割
carbon emission reduction
fiscal decentralization
market segmentation
emission reduction efficiency
