金字塔股权结构与会计谨慎性——基于A股上市公司的实证证据

Pyramid Ownership Structure and Accounting Conservatism——Evidence from China A-share Listed Companies

两权分离的上市公司股权结构通常较为复杂,存在实际控制人通过多层股权链条控制上市公司的金字塔结构,且股东与管理层、大小股东之间存在双重委托代理关系,这些股权结构特点导致的代理问题最终会影响会计谨慎性。本文以2010-2012年我国深沪A股上市公司为样本,通过实证方法研究金字塔结构与会计谨慎性之间的关系,以得到金字塔股权结构影响会计信息谨慎性的证据。最终发现,上市公司的会计信息谨慎性不仅与金字塔股权结构中两权分离程度正相关,还与金字塔层级正相关。

The ownership structure with separation of ownership and control of listed companies are usually complicated.The pyramid ownership structure control listed companies through multi-equity chains.There are two kinds of agency relationships:the first kind is caused by the conflict of interest between shareholders and managers,and the second kind is between principal shareholders and minor shareholders.These agency problems resulting from the complex ownership structure affect accounting conservatism.This paper using 2010-2012 China listed company data,empirically tests the relation between pyramid ownership structure and accounting conservatism and provides the evidence for this relationship.We find that accounting conservatism is not only positively related to the extent of separation between ownership and control and also pyramid layer.