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知识辩护的困境与语境主义辩护观——语境主义的辩护是怎样的 被引量:1

Dilemma of Epistemic Justification and the Idea of Contextualist Justification——What Is the Contextualist Justification
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摘要 知识辩护理论长期处于内在主义与外在主义、基础主义与融贯主义、可错论与不可错论的争论中止步不前。导致这种状况的根源在于争论的双方都在某些方面错误地理解了知识辩护的性质。内在主义和外在主义错误地采取了个体主义立场;基础主义和融贯主义执迷于知识的绝对真理性质,错失了知识的语境性质;对可错论的担忧源于全面而彻底地拒斥怀疑论的幻想。为纠正这些失误,语境主义的辩护观认为,知识辩护是可错的、历时的、公共的。语境主义的辩护是在特定语境下以实用真理为目标的,是在"挑战-辩护"过程中的动态活动。 It seems that the theory of epistemic justification has come to a standstill due to the controversies over internalism and externalism,foundationalism and coherentism,fallibilism and infallibilism. The root cause is that both sides misunderstand the nature of epistemic justification in some way. Internalists and externalists wrongly take the stand of individualism; fundamentalists and coherentists are obsessed by the absolute truth of knowledge,and miss its contextual nature; the worry about fallibilism derives from a fantasy to reject skepticism entirely and thoroughly.To correct these errors,the theory of contextualist justification holds that epistemic justification is fallible,diachronic and public. Aimed at practical truth,contextualist justification is a dynamic activity in the " challenge-justification" process in a specific context.
作者 尹维坤
出处 《科学技术哲学研究》 CSSCI 北大核心 2015年第3期51-56,共6页 Studies in Philosophy of Science and Technology
关键词 辩护 内在主义 外在主义 基础主义 融贯主义 可错论 语境主义 justification internalism externalism foundationalism coherentism fallibilism contextualism
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参考文献13

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