负网络外部性情形下组织际信息系统动态协调机制研究

STUDY OF THE DYNAMIC COORDINATION MECHANISM OF INTERORGANIZATIONAL INFORMATION SYSTEMS UNDER NEGATIVE NETWORK EXTERNALITIES

以制造商和供应商为视角,考虑网络外部性特性,研究组织际信息系统(Interorganizational information systems,IOS)的动态协调关系与策略.设定网络外部性的离散动态属性,引入吸引机制与竞争机制控制向量,给出网络外部性动态最优控制算法与命题;进而构建制造商对供应商有无补贴政策情形下的收益模型,并模拟正负网络外部性、制造商与供应商收益、供应商加入IOS数量的演化轨迹,从而得出组织际信息系统在协调制造商与供应商收益上的动态规律.研究认为:补贴政策可以在IOS的初始阶段实施,但此时注重实施效率;补贴政策在第二三阶段实施,此时竞争机制作用明显,应注重补贴政策的动态与差异性.

This paper starts as a point of manufacturer and suppliers＇ revenue, and considers the network externality of IOS to study on the dynamic coordination re- lationships and strategies for interorganizational information systems. Firstly, this paper sets discrete dynamic properties of network externalities and two control vec- tors of attraction mechanism and competition mechanism, and then gives the network externalities＇ dynamic optimal control algorithm and some propositions. Then, builds revenue structure models, and simulates the evolutionary trajectory of network ex- ternalities, manufacturer and suppliers＇ revenue, the IOS number of suppliers joined under two cases of whether the manufacturer provides the suppliers subsidy policy or not, and comes to the dynamic rule of the interorganizationai information systems＇ coordination of the manufacturer and suppliers. Results suggest that 1） with the increasing number of suppliers, the marginal competition mechanism will be greater than marginal attraction mechanism, making the impact of negative network exter- nalities is far greater than positive network externalities; 2） the impact of positive network externalities and negative network externalities coincide with Metcalfe＇s law （N（N - 1）） under without considering subsidy policy, and the impact of negative network externalities is slightly larger than the Metcalfe＇s law （N（N - 1）） under con- sidering subsidies policy; 3） it should encourage suppliers to enter IOS at the initial stage because the faster reaction about the change of subsidy policy after suppliers entering IOS at the initial stage; 4） the more gains both manufacturer and suppliers can obtain under considering the subsidy policy than without considering the subsidy policy, so the manufacturer should actively adopt the subsidy policy to suppliers to inhibit negative network externalities that all suppliers will join the IOS.