什么导致了民营上市公司股权激励计划的失败?——基于九阳股份“公布-撤销-再实施”的案例分析

What Leads the Equity Incentive Plan of Private Listing Corporation to Fail?A Case Study on the Joyoung Co.'s “Announcement-Cancellation-Re-execution” Procedure

近几年国内外市场竞争不断加剧,而民营企业由于在资源、地位等方面处于相对劣势,因此,它们往往更加迫切地需要借助长期股权激励计划吸引或留住人才,促进企业发展。自2008年以来,我国股市价格处于低位,许多民营上市公司抓住这一有利的时机,争先推出股权激励计划。但在推行的过程中又暴露出许多问题,导致其激励计划的目标无法顺利实现。九阳股份的股权激励计划经历了由"公布"到"撤销",到"再实施"的反复过程,为研究我国民营上市公司股权激励计划的影响因素提供了难得的契机。本文对比了九阳股份第一次与第二次股权激励的具体方案,探讨了两次方案实施的背景、第一次方案失败以及第二次方案成功的原因,并结合该案例总结了影响我国民营上市公司股权激励目标实现的重要因素。

Private enterprises in China need more equity incentive plans for attracting talents, because they are weaker in the resources and social status than state-owned enterprise. In recent years, private listing corporations announced a lot of equity incentive plans, but sometimes they cannot touch the expected aims. We get a good chance to check the determinations of equity incentive plan by analyzing Joyoung＇ s procedure of ＂AnnouncementCancellation- Re-execution＂ in its equity incentive plan. This paper compares the specific terms of the first equity incentive with the second plan in Joyoung Co., discusses the backgrounds of the two plans and the reasons of Joyoung＇ s first failing scheme, analyzes the determinations of equity incentive plan in Chinese private listing corporations, and gives some advices for improving their equity incentive plans.