内部控制与企业避税行

Internal Control and Tax Aggression

企业避税为股东增加价值的同时也增加了违反税收法规的风险,本文从企业合规目标的视角,检验了内部控制对企业避税行为的影响。本文以2007年至2012年沪深证券交易所的A股上市公司为样本,实证研究发现高质量的内部控制能有效抑制企业激进的避税行为;进一步的分析发现,在税收征管执法更严格的环境中,内部控制对企业激进避税行为的约束效应更强。本文的研究结果表明,高质量的内部控制能有助于企业合规目标的实现,减少企业因激进避税而增加的违规风险,并保护投资者利益。本文的研究结果为全面理解我国企业内部控制的经济后果提供了增量的经验证据,也丰富了公司治理机制对企业避税行为影响的研究文献。

Tax aggression enhances the corporate value for shareholders, but also increases the risk of violating tax regulations. This paper examines the impact of internal control on corporate tax aggression from the compliance per-spective. We take the A-share listed companies from 2007 to 2012 in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges as samples, and empirically find that high quality of internal controls can effectively limit corporate tax aggression, especially for high degree of tax aggression. Further analysis shows that there is a higher constraint of internal control over tax aggression in more stringent tax enforcement environment. These results of this paper show that high quality of internal control can help organizations to achieve the purpose of operational compliance, and reduce the noncom-pliance risk due to high degree of aggression. This paper would play a helpful role in comprehensively understanding the economic consequences of our enterprises＇ internal control by providing incremental empirical evidence, but also enrich the research literature about the impact of corporate governance mechanisms on tax aggression.