网络群体事件政府治理的演化博弈分析

Analysis of Government Management in the Network Mass Incidents Based on Evolutionary Game Theory

利用演化博弈模型预测舆论的发展趋势,对政府应对网络群体事件采取的治理模式进行了研究。在一般化复制动态模型基础上建立网络群体事件舆论的传播方程,将地方政府部门与弱势群体的策略互动和行为演化融入到传染病传播模型中,用以模拟舆论的扩散和收敛过程。结果表明:在网络群体事件初期,如果弱势群体通过抗争获得政府补偿的概率不断增大,将造成事态的扩大。此时,地方政府应控制信息的交流程度与初始抗争人数,减缓舆论的扩散;在网络群体事件舆论大范围扩散阶段,上级政府介入并采取惩罚措施,及时披露信息,促使网络舆论的收敛平息,实现社会福利最大化。

This study makes attempts to forecast the trend of public opinion and analyses the different modes of governance that government deals with network mass incidents using evolutionary game theory. The diffusion function of public opinion in network mass incidents is built by using the generalized replieator dynamics model, where the strategy interaction and behavior evolution between local government and social vulnerable groups are put into the traditional infectious disease diffusion model to simulate the spread and convergence process of public opinion. It is concluded that enlarging the probability of obtaining government compensation will cause the mass incidents, and meanwhile, to slow down the spread of public opinion government needs to control the opening communication de- gree and the protester number in the explosion phase. And in order to make the public opinion calm and maximize the social welfare, the high-level government needs to set the punishment mechanism and keep communication open.