电子废弃物源头污染治理的激励与监督

Incentives and Monitoring in E-waste Pollution Control at Sources

消费者环保意识的增强对电子产品生产商潜在收益的影响,运用委托代理理论研究了政府对电子产品生产商的激励与监督问题,引入政府对电子产品生产商的监督和惩罚函数,设计了一个包括政府监督、激励在内的最优激励合同,建立了政府期望收益最大化的优化模型。通过比较分析潜在收益和监督机制发生作用的效度,得出:消费者对绿色产品偏好增加的潜在收益是电子产品生产商参与电子废弃物源头污染治理的内在动力;政府的功能不仅是通过激励、监督引导电子产品生产商进行电子废弃物源头污染治理,还应发挥消费者的监督作用;但奖惩力度设计不合理会产生"鞭打快牛"现象。

We study the Incentives and Monitoring of government on electronic products manufacturers using principle-agent theory. We introduce the monitoring cost and penalty, construct an optimal incentive contract, and build a model to maximize the expected revenue for government. By analyzing the potential benefits from electronic products manufacturers and the supervision mechanism of the government department, we find that the preference of green consumption is the driving force for the manufacturers taking part in the activity of electronic wastes pollution control, hence the roles of government in electronic waste source pollution control are to impel and supervise the electronic products manufacturers, and furthermore, to inspire customers adopt green consumption. However, the special attention should be paid to is that government should design appropriate penalty for electronic products manufacturers so to avoid ratcheting effect.