可错论:从皮尔士到苏珊·哈克

Fallibilism: From C. S. Peirce to Susan Haack

作为唯理论代表,笛卡儿试图把知识大厦建构在坚实的理性基础上。他确信,如果心灵对认识对象具有清楚明白的观念,那么它就是真的。此种观点被称为独断论。实用主义鼻祖皮尔士拒斥笛卡儿式的独断论,提倡可错论,但其可错论并不彻底。哈克察觉到皮尔士的困境,主张更加彻底的可错论,即包括数学、逻辑在内的所有知识均是可错的。哈克的可错论是对皮尔士的继承发展,它处于独断论和怀疑论之间,是一种颇诱人的更稳健的认识论。

As a representative of rationalist, Descartes tried to put the knowledge of reconstruction on the basis of rational foundation. He was convinced that, if the mind is clear to know the concept of object, and then it is true. This view is called dogmatism. Pragmatic originator C. S. Peiree rejects Cartesian dogmatism, but advocates fallibilism. However, Peirce＇s fallibilism is not complete, and in the face of mathematics and logic, he looks shilly-shally. Susan Haack was keenly aware of the predicament of Peirce, and advocated a more thorough fallibilism, in which all knowledge including mathematics and logic is fallible. Haack＇s fallibilsm is the inheritance and development for that of Peirce, which is the third road between dognatism and skepticism, and is a quite attractive and more robust epistemology.