国际生态系统服务付费的生态政治经济学批判研究——智力重商主义与特许权公平

Intellectual Mercantilism and Franchise Equity:A Critical Study of the Ecological Political Economy of International Payments for Ecosystem Services

文章旨在探讨国际生态系统服务付费(IPES)的生态政治经济学问题。以"减少发展中国家砍伐森林和森林退化导致的温室气体排放联合国合作方案(REDD)"为例,文章提出以下问题:IPES机制对热带国家原住民造成影响的方式可能是什么?有观点认为,对REED一类的生态系统服务付费(PES)机制进行评价时,不应只关注分配权公平问题(各方是否分得足够的蛋糕?),还应关注特许权公平问题(是否所有人都想参与分蛋糕?),并指出IPES机制没有考虑特许权公平问题,反映出了某种形式的智力重商主义——将现有地方可得资源重新定义为"可在国际上进行交易的投机性商品",实现财富从新经济体向旧经济体的转移。文章运用德勒泽克和斯蒂文森讨论协商制度时所提出的规范政治理论,对两个实证案例——REDD+社会与环境标准(即REDD+SES)和YASUNI-ITT环保项目进行了讨论。

This text addresses the ecological political economy of international payment for ecosystem services （IPES）. Taking the United Nations Collaborative Programme on Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradationin Developing Countries （REDD） as a case in point, it asks： in what ways may IPES schemes impingeupen the political and economic autonomy of local and indigenous peoples in tropical countries？ It is arguedthat PES schemes like REDD should be assessed not only with respect to questions of distributional equity（ does everyone have enough pie？ ） but also with respect to franchise equity （ does everyone want pie？） andthat failure to take questions of franchise equity into account in IPES schemes reflects a formorintellectualm- ercantilism,wbere wealth transfers from new economies to old ones are achieved by redefining existing local- lyavailable resources as internationally tradable speculative commodities. This proposition is considered throughexploration of two illustrative cases - the REDD ＋ Social and Environmental Standards （ REDD ＋ SES） and theYasunl - ITT 4nitiative - and through normative political theory recommendations building on Dryzek andStevenson＇s discussion of deliberative systems, regarding how it might be possible to ensure franchise equity- within REDD ＋ in particular and within global environmental governance, more generally.