摘要
针对服装企业个性化服务水平与成本收益之间的均衡问题,利用演化博弈理论,探讨二级服装供应链上服装原材料供应商和服装制造商个性化服务成本收益情况对其策略选择的影响,研究服装企业在何种情况下采取个性化策略既能满足消费者需求,又能有效实现利益最大化。结果表明,策略选择不仅受企业自身行为的影响,也与上下游企业策略选择有着密切的关联。在竞争市场中,只有当供应链成员企业个性化水平均达到一定程度时,即企业个性化收益增加额不仅大于成本投入,而且还大于自身搭便车过程中获得的额外收益,个性化服务策略才是企业动态演化的方向以及最终稳定点。
Aiming at the equilibrium problem between customized service level and cost-benefit control in apparel corporations, this paper discussed how cost-benefit analysis influences customized service decisions for raw material vendors and manufacturers in two-stages apparel supply chain and investigated in which case enterprises' customized service decision can both satisfy the demands of consumers and achieve the maximum benefit based on evolutionary game theory. The results show that one enterprise's selection of customized service strategy is not only influenced by its behavior but also closely related to the decisions of its upstream corporations and downstream corporations. In a competitive market, the evolutionary direction and final stable equilibrium point can be obtained only if customized services of different corporations achieve the same level. In this case, enterprises' additional benefits from customized service are not only greater than costs for customized service but also more than additional orofit by taking a "free rider" during the process of 13rovidinz service.
出处
《纺织学报》
EI
CAS
CSCD
北大核心
2015年第6期135-140,共6页
Journal of Textile Research
基金
国家自然科学基金项目(71071144)
关键词
服装企业
个性化服务
演化博弈
稳定均衡
apparel corporation
customized service
evolutionary game
stable equilibrium