机构持股、投资决策与高管薪酬——基于经理人职业声誉模型的理论分析

Institutional Ownership,Investment Decisions and Executive Compensation——Analysis of a career concerns model of managers

机构投资者持股对公司治理的积极作用已经得到广泛认可,然而传统观点认为增加机构持股比例会抑制公司投资、降低高管薪酬,这与近期实证研究发现的证据存在矛盾。为此构建了基于经理人职业声誉顾虑的理论模型,试图为相关实证结果提供合理的解释。研究表明,机构持股比例越高,越能增强机构投资者监督、了解经理人经营能力的意愿,从而确保高能力经理人不会因偶然投资失败而面临声誉风险,这就增大了高能力经理人为公司投资创利的可能性,同时也使经理人能够获得与自身经营能力相适应的薪酬回报。

Institutional investors holding an active role in corporate governance has been widely recognized,but the tradi-tional view that increases in the proportion of institutional ownership will inhibit investment and reduce executive compen-sation,which contradicts the evidence of recent empirical researches.In this paper,a theoretical model was constructed based on the manager′s career concerns,trying to provide a reasonable explanation for the relevant empirical results.Stud-ies have shown that the higher the proportion of institutional ownership,the more investors′willing to supervise the manag-ers,ensuring high capability managers will not fail due to accidental reputational risk.Therefore,managers will have a greater possibility to make profitable investment,while be able to get rewards according to their capability.