网络产业中的非对称规制政策——基于马尔科夫精炼均衡的数值模拟

Network Industry and Non-symmetrical Regulation Policy——A Numerical Simulation of Markov Perfect Equilibrium

本文研究非对称规制政策对网络产业的影响。文中基于Ericson-Pakes动态分析框架,构建包含网络效应与非对称规制税的动态博弈模型,并利用Pakes-Mc Guire算法与逆向递归法求解其马尔科夫精炼均衡。数值实验表明,网络产业存在两类基本均衡:分享均衡与倾翻均衡。其中,分享均衡的市场竞争较为温和;倾翻均衡中,企业市场势力相近时存在激烈的价格战,存在"滚雪球"现象。非对称规制会削弱企业进行价格战的动机,减轻市场倾翻。但规制亦会减弱企业的投资性定价激励,导致市场平均价格上升,市场效率降低。由于网络产业中市场需求缺乏弹性,非对称规制政策的实施成本主要由消费者而非企业承担。

This article studies the influence of non-symmetrical regulation policy on network industry. Basing on Ericson-Pakes Framework, a dynamic model of network industry which includes the non-symmetrical regulation tax is constructed and solved by Pakes-McGuirc and Backward Recursion Methods. Numerical simulation found two kind of equilibrium： Sharing Equilibrium and Tipping Equilibrium. In Sharing Equilibrium, there is only mild competition. In Tipping Equilibrium, there are intense price war while both firms own market power, tend to form a snow-bailing phenomenon. Non-symmetrical regulation policy will weaken the intention of firms to competent for market dominance. However, it will also weaken the investment pricing intention, result in average price increasing and lower market efficiency. Because in-elastic demand of consumers, regulation cost is not mainly undertaken by firms, but by consumers.