两阶段双任务委托代理情形下煤矿安全管理激励机制

The Incentive under Principle-agent Relationship with Two Stages and Double Tasks in Coalmine Safety Management

煤矿企业安全监管效能低下一直困扰煤炭行业的重大问题,监管效能低下的根本原因是煤矿企业的委托代理激励机制的失衡,进而导致在安全产出中搭便车行为大量存在.煤矿的委托代理问题是一个多阶段多任务的动态问题,因此构造了一个两阶段双任务的委托代理模型.在模型第二阶段中煤矿职工能够通过对第一阶段信息的学习了解自身努力与回报之间的映射,进而决定自己在两项任务的委托代理中努力程度的付出.通过模型的分析得到:煤炭生产任务的正向激励会对煤矿职工在安全产出方面的努力程度造成负面的影响,且煤矿职工在完成安全产出任务方面的能力越高,在此方面努力程度就下降的越慢,降低截断水平能够导致更多的职工在第二阶段的工作中提高努力水平,进而减少搭便车行为.

The major problem of low efficien cy in coal mine enter prises safety supervision has been worrying the coal industry, and the fundamental reason is the imbalance of entrusted agency mechanism of coal mine enter prises, leading to the existence of serious free rider in the safety production. In fact, many related researches have shown that the principle-agency problem in coal mine should be a dynamic one of multi-stages and multi-tasks, so an entrusted agency model of two stages and double tasks is established in this paper. In the second stage of the model, coal mine workers are able to learn about the mapping between their own efforts and the rewards through the learning of the information in the first stage, and then know their level of efforts in fulfilling the two entrusted tasks. It has been found from the analysis of the model that a positive incentive of coal production tasks can have a negative effect on how hard the coal mine workers work in the safety production, and the higher ability coal mine workers have in completing safety production tasks, the more slowly this level of effort will decline, reducing the cut-off level would make the workers work harder in the second stage, which then may decrease the free rider.