IPO发行制度与信息披露质量——基于保荐制实施与否的比较

The Design of IPO Listing System and the Quality of Information Disclosure——Based on the Comparison of Whether the Sponsor Policy is Implemented or not

本文针对近年来国内IPO公司信息披露质量不尽人意的现状,综合考虑拟上市公司、保荐人和监管部门之间的委托代理关系,采用信息不对称问题的研究框架比较了有无保荐制的发行制度下的社会效益最优模型。理论上,通过求解各模型的均衡解并对结果进行比较发现,在适宜的监管函数下保荐制能够一定程度上提高拟上市公司的信息披露质量。然而通过实证分析发现,目前国内IPO保荐制在提高信息披露质量方面表现堪忧,主要原因在于监管行为的力度不足以对各方参与人形成有效制约。

In view of the status quo of unsatisfactory quality in the domestic IPO information disclosure in recent years, comprehensively considering the relationships among pre-listing companies, sponsors, and regulatory authorities, the research framework of information asymmetry is applied, the social optimal models of whether the sponsor policy is implemented or not are compared. In theory, by solving and comparing the equilibrium of the models, it is found that under the appropriate regulatory functions, the sponsor system can improve the quality of information disclosure of pro-listing companies. However, the empirical analysis found that, the current domestic IPO sponsor system performs poorly in improving the quality of information disclosure, for the reason of insufficient regulatory actions which fails to effectively constraint participants.