高管薪酬激励的经济外部性实证研究——基于债权人利益保护视角

An Empirical Study on the Economic Externality of Executive Compensation Incentives——Based on the Prospective of Protecting Creditors' Interests

会计稳健性是短期债务契约的重要需求。文章通过考察不同高管薪酬激励形式对会计稳健性和债务期限的影响,来研究高管薪酬激励给债权人带来的经济外部性。研究发现,高管现金薪酬越大,会计稳健性越低,会导致公司短期债务比例越小,债权人对会计稳健性的需求会降低,故高现金薪酬的经济外部性较小;高管持股越多,会计稳健性越低,会导致公司短期借款比例越大,从而债权人对会计稳健性的需求会更大,因而高管持股的经济外部性较大。文章还检验了高管薪酬激励与公司债务违约概率的关系,研究结果进一步证实了上述结论。

Accounting conservatism is an important demand of short-term debt contract. The paper studies the economic externality of creditors brought by executive compensation incentives through investigating the impacts of different types of executive compensation incentives on accounting conservatism and debt maturity. The study finds that the higher the executive cash compensation,the lower the accounting conservatism,which leads to companies’ short-term debt ratio getting smaller and creditors decreasing their demand for accounting conservatism,thus the economic externality of executive cash compensation is small. Whereas the more the executive stock ownership,the lower the accounting conservatism,which results in companies’ short-term debt ratio getting higher and creditors increasing their demand for accounting conservatism,so the economic externality of executive ownership is big. The paper also tests the relationship between executive compensation incentives and company’s defaulting probabilities of debt,the test results further confirm the above conclusions.