援助之手、攫取之手与民生类公共品供给

Helping hand,Grabbing hand,and the Public Goods Supply

本文基于新税收集权理论,通过提出三个假设来验证援助之手、攫取之手与民生类公共品供给间的影响效应。通过构造分省的民生类公共品供给指数、转移支付与"两只手"面板数据与模型,实证分析发现:第一,援助之手对民生类公共品供给具有正向效应,但是其激励效应受到了攫取之手的显著抑制。第二,分地区考察中,"两只手"的治理模式对民生类公共品供给影响存在地区异质性差异,攫取之手对公共品供给的负面效应在税收净流入地区更大。第三,与援助之手类似,中央转移支付对公共品供给具有促进作用,但同样受到了攫取之手的抑制。最后,本文从三个方面提出了完善优化"两只手"治理模式对民生类公共品供给的相关政策启示与建议。

Based on the theory of new tax centralization, this paper puts forward three hypotheses to test the effect of helping hand and grabbing hand on the supply of public goods concerning people＇s livelihood. The empirical analysis with the panel data and model finds that： First, the helping hand has a positive effect on the public goods supply, but its incentive effects are significantly curbed by the grabbing hand; Second, the governance pattern of the ＂two hands＂ shows regional heter- ogeneity differences; Third, similar to the helping hand, the central transfer payments plays a promoting role in the public goods supply.