高管团队内部薪酬差距对投资效率影响的实证研究——以A股国有上市公司为例

Empirical Study on the Effect of Executive Team's Internal Pay Gap upon Investment Efficiency——Taking the State-owned A-share Listed Companies as Example

结合中国的特殊制度背景,以2006—2013年中国A股国有上市公司为样本,考察了A股国有上市公司高管团队内部薪酬差距对投资效率产生的影响。结果发现,适当提高高管团队内部薪酬差距能够抑制我国A股国有上市公司的非效率投资,并且对过度投资也有抑制作用;对投资不足的影响效果则不明显。但过大的高管团队内部薪酬差距对投资效率产生的负面影响不容忽视。此外,高管团队内部薪酬差距对A股国有上市公司非效率投资的抑制作用存在拐点,超过该拐点,薪酬差距对非效率投资则起到促进作用。研究结论为国有企业制定更合理的工资薪酬差距提供了实证证据,也为解决我国国有企业的管理者激励问题指明了方向。

Under the background of China＇s special institution, this article takes the sample of Chinese A-share listed companies during the period from 2006 to 2013 to examine the effect of executive team＇s internal pay gap on the investment efficiency of the listed companies. The results find that properly widening executive team＇s internal pay tap can curb the inefficient investment of the state-owned listed companies in China, and the pay gap mainly hinders the overinvestment, but have no obvious effect on the underinvestment. However, the adverse effect of too wide internal pay gap within the executive team on the investment efficiency cannot be neglected. This article finds that there is a turning point in the effect of the executive team＇s internal pay gap on inefficient investment of the state-owned A-share listed companies. Once the pay gap exceeds the turning point, it is positive in the effect of the pay gap on inefficient investment. The study in this article provides empirical evidence for China＇s state-owned listed companies to work out their more reasonable pay gap. At the same time, it guides the direction to solve the problem of managers＇ stimuli in China＇s state-owned enterprises.